When global norms meet local politics : localising transparency in extractive industries governance by Winanti, P.S. & Hanif, H.
This is a repository copy of When global norms meet local politics : localising transparency
in extractive industries governance.
White Rose Research Online URL for this paper:
http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/164624/
Version: Published Version
Article:
Winanti, P.S. and Hanif, H. orcid.org/0000-0002-2531-8256 (2020) When global norms 
meet local politics : localising transparency in extractive industries governance. 
Environmental Policy and Governance. ISSN 1756-932X 
https://doi.org/10.1002/eet.1907
eprints@whiterose.ac.uk
https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/
Reuse 
This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) licence. This licence 
allows you to distribute, remix, tweak, and build upon the work, even commercially, as long as you credit the 
authors for the original work. More information and the full terms of the licence here: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/ 
Takedown 
If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by 
emailing eprints@whiterose.ac.uk including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request. 
S P E C I A L I S S U E A R T I C L E
When global norms meet local politics: Localising transparency
in extractive industries governance
Poppy Sulistyaning Winanti1 | Hasrul Hanif2,3
1Department of International Relations,
Universitas Gadjah Mada, Yogyakarta,
Indonesia
2Department of Politics and Government,
Universitas Gadjah Mada, Yogyakarta,
Indonesia
3Department of Politics and International
Relations, University of Sheffield, Sheffield, UK
Correspondence
Poppy Sulistyaning Winanti, Department of
International Relations, Universitas Gadjah
Mada, Yogyakarta, Indonesia.
Email: poppysw@ugm.ac.id
Hasrul Hanif, Department of Politics and
International Relations, University of Sheffield,
Sheffield, UK.
Email: hhanif1@sheffield.ac.uk
Abstract
Processes of norm localisation play a crucial role in shaping the extent to which
global governance norms are institutionalised at national and sub-national levels. This
article explores the politics of norm localisation through an empirical investigation
of how global norms of “transparency” were localised in sub-national processes of
extractive industry governance in Bojonegoro, Indonesia. Previous theories
of localisation have emphasised “constructivist” dynamics through which patterns of
norm localisation are shaped decisively by efforts to build normative or cognitive
congruence with local ideas and identities. In contrast, the mix of a newly
democratised environment, the persistent power of corporatist elite networks and a
populist style of local politics prevailing in Bojonegoro have diminished the signifi-
cance of such constructivist dynamics as a basis for explaining varied patterns of
norm localisation. Instead, patterns of norm localisation have depended crucially on the
capacity of local political leaders to harness global governance norms instrumentally as a
basis for consolidating and strengthening their own local power base. These findings
have important implications for both theoretical and practical understandings of how
global norm localisation processes vary in response to the contrasting political contexts
in which global governance norms targeting the extractive sector are implemented.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
In recent decades, transparency has been widely promoted as a global
governance norm, comprising a key ingredient of broader interna-
tional agendas of “good governance” and corruption eradication
directed towards resource-rich countries (see Collier, 2007, p. 178;
Stiglitz, 2007, p. 39). Transparency has been variously presented as a
means of opening communication channels, facilitating scrutiny of
revenues gathered from natural resource extraction, facilitating civil
society participation in natural resource governance and promoting
accountability for how resource rents are channelled into the promo-
tion of sustainable development (Barma, Kaiser, Minh, &
Vinuela, 2012, p. 4).
Yet efforts to institutionalise such global governance norms at
national and sub-national scales often encounter significant challenges
when global norms come into tension with established normative
frameworks at local levels. Efforts to implement transparency norms
on the ground have been pursued through various policies and inter-
ventions. Those include a range of strategies that seek to correct fail-
ures of resource management and develop accountable resourcePoppy Sulistyaning Winanti and Hasrul Hanif Both authors contributed equally to this work.
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governance through the timely disclosure of government information
and the enhancement of strong multi-stakeholder involvement in
monitoring (Bourgouin & Haarstad, 2013, p. 91; Mejía Acosta, 2013,
p. 591). As part of this broader trend, new international standards,
such as the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS), the
Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI)1 and its progenitor,
the global Publish What You Pay (PWYP) coalition, came to the fore
of reform, seeking to impede rent-seeking behaviour and corruption
through the disclosure of government revenue derived from extrac-
tive sectors (Corrigan, 2014; Hendrix, 2014). Although these schemes
have made significant inroads, they have also been widely contested,
and implementation has been mixed. For example, existing studies
have shown EITI implementation to depend on a range of factors
including local institutional quality and configurations of power and
interest between state, business and civil society organisations
(Bourgouin & Haarstad, 2013; Gonzales-Espinosa & Klein, 2013; Vijge,
Metcalfe, Wallbott, & Oberlack, 2019).
Such challenges have been the subject of an expansive body of
scholarship on “norm localisation” – the central focus of this special
issue. Following Acharya's influential definition (2004, p. 241), the
concept of norm localisation is used here to refer to “… a complex pro-
cess and outcome by which norm-takers build congruence between
transnational norms (including norms previously institutionalised in a
region) and local beliefs and practices.” This concept provides “a
framework that explains how transnational norms are contested,
adapted and incorporated into a new … context”
(Capie, 2008, p. 639).
While recognition that norm dynamics vary between contrasting
local contexts centrally underpins the concept of norm localisation,
existing scholarship on this issue has not systematically theorised how
norm localisation varies across political contexts in response to con-
trasting political systems, regime types, or political styles. Instead, the-
ories of norm localisation have tended to develop more general
hypotheses regarding the mechanisms through which norm
localisation occurs and conditions under which global norms are likely
to be successfully institutionalised on the ground – focusing in partic-
ular on the importance of processes through which normative and
cognitive congruence can be established between global norms and
local cultural and political beliefs and practices.
To explore the robustness of such theories across a range of local
political contexts, this article explores norm localisation dynamics
within one particular political context that has been under-studied
within existing norm localisation scholarship (cf. Bourgouin &
Haarstad, 2013, p. 104), but which is highly significant for discussions
of extractive industry governance: that is, newly democratised coun-
tries characterised by a populist political style. Populism can be
broadly understood as a “political strategy through which a personalis-
tic leader seeks or exercises government power based on direct,
unmediated, uninstitutionalised support from large numbers of mostly
unorganized followers” (Weyland, 2001, p. 14).2 Of particular rele-
vance to this article's analysis are concepts of populism that focus on
behavioural aspects of populist leadership through reference to a
populist “political style” (Bonikowski, 2016, p. 14; Moffitt, 2017, p. 46;
Moffitt & Tormey, 2013, p. 388).
In contexts characterised by a populist political style, leaders rely
heavily on rhetorical and performative strategies as means of building
popular political support (Moffitt & Tormey, 2013, pp. 387–391). Pre-
vious scholarship on populism as a political style has demonstrated
that the political mobilisation of norms often plays a crucial role in
underpinning the rhetorical strategies of populist leaders (see
Jayasuriya, 2006, pp. 126–145; Mas'udi & Kurniawan, 2017). Despite
such evidence regarding the significance of a populist political style
for the politics of norm contestation, the implications of such political
contexts for theories of norm localisation have not been systemati-
cally explored.
In this article, norm localisation dynamics within this distinctive
political context are examined through an investigation of how the
global norm of transparency is promoted and institutionalised within
sub-national processes of extractive industry governance in Indonesia.
Analysis examines both the processes through which localisation
occurs, and the conditions that enable and constrain local
institutionalisation of these global norms.3
To develop this analysis, the article first examines theoretical
debates concerning how and under what conditions global norms can
be institutionalised at the local level, and how varied political contexts
might be expected to shape such processes. This is followed by a brief
discussion of the article's methodology. Next, an empirical case study
of the localisation of transparency norms in the oil and gas sector in
Indonesia is presented. This empirical analysis is divided into two parts
– results and discussion – which examine respectively: the broad con-
gruence of global transparency norms with the post-authoritarian
political climate in Indonesia, the rise of democratic populism as a
political style in Indonesia, and the ways in which this political envi-
ronment shaped uneven patterns of localisation of global transpar-
ency norms. The article concludes with some reflections on the
article's central findings.
While previous theories of localisation have emphasised “construc-
tivist” dynamics through which patterns of norm localisation are shaped
decisively by efforts to build normative or cognitive congruence with
local ideas and identities, this article's analysis demonstrates that such
findings need to be adapted for a political context characterised by a
democratic populist political style. Localisation of the global transparency
agenda in this case was facilitated by significant congruence between
global transparency norms and the political beliefs and practices preva-
iling within Indonesia's post-authoritarian political environment. None-
theless, patterns of norm institutionalisation remained very uneven,
particularly with regard to transparency norms concerning public
accountability and civil society participation. While norm localisation was
facilitated to the extent that local political leaders harnessed global trans-
parency norms in support of their own political strategies, transparency
norms remained weakly institutionalised when they came into conflict
with the instrumental political interests of local political leaders. While
the article does not discount the importance of normative congruence as
a basis for norm localisation, it therefore concludes that it is ultimately
2 WINANTI AND HANIF
the material political interests of local norm-takers rather than their nor-
mative or cognitive orientations that contribute most decisively to
explaining varied patterns of norm localisation.
2 | THEORISING NORM LOCALISATION IN
THE LOCAL CONTEXT
Early waves of research on how global norms travel to local contexts
focused centrally on the role of international actors such as transnational
advocacy networks in actively generating and diffusing global norms
(Checkel, 1999; Keck & Kathryn, 1998). Particular attention was given to
the role of so-called global norm entrepreneurs (Capie, 2008, pp. 639,
2012), defined by Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, p. 896) as agents who
engage not only in normative agenda-setting, but also active promotion of
norms.
As this body of scholarship evolved, the focus shifted towards an
interest in actors situated at local (rather than global) levels, and the
potentially crucial role of local “norm-takers” in shaping norm adop-
tion processes. The concept of “norm takers” was coined in reference
to local actors who according to Acharya (2004, p. 269) do not simply
passively receive norms, but rather play a critical role in facilitating the
norm adoption process. Depending on the context, these may take
the form of government officials, civil society organisations or other
individuals. The presence of these norm takers and their responses to
global norms are now widely recognised to comprise important com-
ponents of the norm localisation process.
A central focus of this evolving norm localisation scholarship has
been the question of the conditions under which global norms are likely
to be institutionalised at the local level in line with the original purposes
of global normative agendas. One influential theoretical current has
focused on the importance of normative, cognitive or cultural “fit” as a
basis for explaining when global norms are likely to be accepted and
institutionalised in a given local context. An important version of this
account was developed by Acharya (2004), who argued that norm
localisation is most likely to occur when outside norms can establish
some form of congruence with established local beliefs and practices.
Similarly, Eimer et al. (2016) argued that the particular characteristics of a
given localisation process will depend importantly on the interplay
between international pressure and domestic preferences, while Cortell
and Davis (2000) highlighted the significance of “cultural match” between
international norms and domestic understandings in determining the
degree to which global norms achieve traction at the local level.
Building on this broad interest in enabling conditions for norm
localisation, some scholars have focused on exploring specific mecha-
nisms through which localisation occurs. Reflecting this interest, Acha-
rya developed a sophisticated account of the mechanisms of norm
localisation, and the agency of norm-takers in such processes. Acha-
rya (2011, p. 4) argued that norm localisation is “…a dynamic process
of constitutive localisation” that enables norm-takers to build congru-
ence between local and external norms. The concept of constitutive
localisation highlights the importance of existing ideas, norms, and cul-
ture as influences on an individual or community's acceptance of new
norms. Since local actors as norm-takers are not “passive targets”
(Acharya, 2011, p. 7), they may modify the meaning and scope of exter-
nal norms. Such modification is necessary so that the norms can be
coherent with existing local beliefs and practices and can fit the circum-
stances and preferences of local actors. According to this view, norm
localisation occurs when successful fusion occurs between foreign and
local ideas. Such an account resonates strongly with broader constructiv-
ist accounts of social change that focus on “micro-processes of persua-
sion and social influence” instead of “strategic calculation” as
determinants of normative and behavioural change (Acharya, 2011, p. 3).
Although such broadly constructivist understandings of norm
localisation mechanisms have been dominant within existing norm
localisation scholarship, the potential significance of more strategic drivers
of norm-taking behaviour has also been recognised. For example, Cortell &
Davis (2000, pp. 76–77) underlined the frequent importance of instrumen-
tal strategies of rhetoric and performance by societal leaders as means of
generating transformed collective understandings and building domestic
salience of global norms. Such rhetorical strategies were viewed as poten-
tial means through which local norm-takers could seek to alter collective
understandings amongst other social actors at the local level – serving in
turn as a basis for strategically advancing their own material interests. As
argued by Cortell and Davis (2000, p. 78): “international norms can
become salient in the domestic discourse by being linked to important
material interests… Any number of international norms may be consistent
with a given constellation of domestic interests.”
Such work has tended to theorise the mechanisms through which
norm localisation occurs – and associated conditions under which global
norms are likely to be successfully institutionalised – in relatively general
terms. Such analyses have rarely given explicit attention to the question
of how norm localisation might be expected to vary across political con-
texts, for example reflecting varied political systems, regime types, or
political styles. Nonetheless, a small number of authors have made some
preliminary efforts to explore contextual factors shaping norm-takers'
responses to global norms, and associated norm localisation processes.
For example, Shawki (2011) has highlighted the potential significance of
factors such as government openness, state capacity, and the presence
of supportive national or sub-national elites as enabling factors associ-
ated with successful norm localisation. Such analyses resonate with
broader theories of political opportunity structures, developed in the
context of analysing the influence of global social movements or advo-
cacy coalitions. Such broader theories have often focused on political
and institutional dimensions of the political environment “that provide
incentives for people to undertake collection action…” and create
enabling opportunities for the promotion of global norms (Gleditsch &
Ruggeri, 2010; Meyer & Minkoff, 2004, p. 1459).
Analyses of contextual variation have also been developed in
studies examining the localisation of specific norms, including some of
the specialised literature focused on global transparency norms in
extractive sector governance. Such literature has often focused on
the distinctive dynamics of localisation associated with certain kinds
of autocratic regimes – of central interest to many natural resource
governance scholars. Such work has sought to uncover the prefer-
ences of norm entrepreneurs and norm-takers and the underlying
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political motivations driving the adoption of transparency within par-
ticular regimes (David-Barrett & Okamura, 2016; David-Barrett &
Okamura, 2013; Gillies, 2010). For example, depending on context,
governments may be motivated to adhere to the EITI in pursuit of
material benefits promised by international actors in return for reform
progress, or as a way of building a reputation for clean and transpar-
ent government with the international community (David-Barrett &
Okamura, 2016, p. 242). In turn, such studies have provided the basis
for analysis of the impact of global governance initiatives such as EITI
on strengthened extractive industry governance at national levels
(Corrigan, 2014), or less commonly, at sub-national scales (see
Wilson & Van Alstine, 2014).
Such work has highlighted the responsiveness of norm
localisation processes to varying motivations of local political leaders
and acknowledged the ways in which such motivations – and associ-
ated political strategies for promoting global norms – can vary signifi-
cantly across different kinds of political regimes. However, such
sources of contextual variance have not so far been systematically or
explicitly explored within existing scholarship on norm localisation.
The following case study analysis aims to advance understanding of
such contextually-responsive dynamics by exploring the implications
of a democratic populist political context for processes through which
global transparency norms have been localised in Indonesian extrac-
tive sector governance.
3 | RESEARCH METHODS
This article's analysis of norm localisation dynamics focuses on a case
study of how the global norm of transparency is promoted and
institutionalised within sub-national processes of extractive industry gov-
ernance in Indonesia. Indonesia makes an ideal case for exploring norm
localisation dynamics in the extractive sector. It has adopted various
global initiatives targeting transparency as part of broader good gover-
nance reforms – Indonesia being a key supporter of the Open Govern-
ment Partnership (OGP) initiative, and having participated in the
Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI) since mid-2000 (see
Rosser & Kartika, 2019; Soerjoatmodjo, Hanafi, & Triwibowo, 2014). At
the same time, efforts to implement these global norms have encoun-
tered significant challenges in the context of Indonesia's newly
democratised political system and the rise of populism.4
In view of high levels of decentralisation in post-authoritarian
Indonesia, including decentralisation of significant responsibilities for
extractive industry governance to sub-national levels, it makes sense
in this context to focus analysis on a particular sub-national site of
norm localisation.5 A sub-national focus is particularly salient given
that the EITI Global Standard has required since 2011 that compliant
countries disclose material revenue flows at sub-national as well as
national levels. While a small number of previous studies have exam-
ined the distinctive dynamics of EITI contestation and
institutionalisation at sub-national scales (see e.g., Wilson & Van
Alstine, 2014), sub-national processes of norm localisation have gen-
erally been under-researched.
Analysis focuses on norm localisation in the Indonesian Regency
of Bojonegoro – a resource-abundant district in the province of East
Java. Bojonegoro is a particularly appropriate location for studying
norm localisation dynamics, since compared with other resource-rich
districts in Indonesia, Bojonegoro has been a major focus of interest
and concern for many international donors and civil society organisa-
tions seeking to implement transparency initiatives, such as the World
Bank, PWYP, Tifa Foundation, and the Natural Resource Governance
Institute (NRGI). This focus can be explained in part by the fact that
the discovery of large reserves of oil and gas in Bojonegoro coincided
in temporal terms with the rise of global attention to the so-called
“resource curse,” and associated efforts by international actors to pro-
mote transparency as part of a broader good governance agenda. In
contrast, most oil-rich regions in Indonesia have been exploited since
the oil boom era in the 1970s (see Smith, 2007).
The authors collected the data through several methods. As part
of the authors' involvement in policy advocacy and capacity building
in enhancing transparency in resource governance in Southeast Asia,
organised by RegINA,6 the authors conducted a series of field visits in
Bojonegoro from 2014 to 2017 and early 2019 (six times). During
these periods of fieldwork, the authors conducted participatory obser-
vation as well as facilitating and participating in a series of meetings
and group discussions with the head of district, key local government
officers, local communities and local civil society organisations. Fur-
thermore, the authors conducted in-depth interviews and discussions
with local government officers, local CSO activists, national CSO
activists, staff in charge of international donor agencies and NGOs
that work on the EITI, in Bojonegoro, Yogyakarta and Jakarta from
2013–2019. Analysis also draws on previous studies on both trans-
parency and local politics in Bojonegoro, supplemented by informa-
tion from news outlets, including both online local and national media
and newspapers.
4 | RESULTS: LOCALISING
TRANSPARENCY IN SUB-NATIONAL
RESOURCE GOVERNANCE IN INDONESIA
Discussion now turns to the empirical case study of norm localisation
processes in Indonesia, examining how local actors linked external
norms with established local norms and practices, and how such strat-
egies reflected distinctive features of the local political context. This
section first explores the opportunities for norm localisation created
by Indonesia's post-authoritarian environment. It then examines the
distinctive features of the populist political style and corporatist
power structures prevailing within post-authoritarian Indonesia.
Finally, it examines the ways in which this distinctive political environ-
ment shaped uneven patterns of localisation of global transparency
norms in the case of Bojonegoro.
Analysis of this case reveals that the localisation of global trans-
parency norms was facilitated to some extent by normative and cogni-
tive congruence between global transparency norms and prevailing
beliefs and identities within post-authoritarian Indonesia. However,
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patterns of norm localisation were highly uneven, closely tracking the
political interests of populist local elites. Norm institutionalisation was
facilitated by the frequent capacity of local elites to harness global
transparency norms as part of broader rhetorical strategies seeking to
bolster their own political support base. In contrast, where global
transparency norms conflicted with local elite interests, normative
congruence was not sufficient to override these interests, and the
adoption of global norms remained more tightly circumscribed.
4.1 | New spaces for localising transparency in
Indonesia's post-authoritarian environment
Following broader global trends associated with agendas of “good
governance” in extractive sector governance, global transparency
norms were promoted within Indonesia by broad-based coalitions of
global and national norm entrepreneurs. The central coalition promot-
ing transparency norms in Indonesia encompassed sub-national,
national and international NGOs, with each group adopting comple-
mentary roles and responsibilities. International actors, notably the
Natural Resource Governance Institute (NRGI), played a significant
role in mainstreaming and diffusing the resource curse discourse and
associated notions of transparency among Indonesian civil society
organisations and government officials – both through financing pro-
jects and exchanging ideas.7 National NGOs also facilitated capacity-
building for local CSOs via provision of grants for institution-building
and knowledge-sharing exchanges between local and national CSOs
in Indonesia and the wider Southeast Asia region.8
The broad political and discursive environment within post-
authoritarian Indonesia played an important role in creating condu-
cive opportunities for global transparency norms to be promoted
and institutionalised, as global transparency agendas resonated with
emerging democratic norms and identities at the local level.
Demands for political change and associated institutional reforms to
governance systems following the fall of the authoritarian regime
created a conducive environment for promotion of transparency
norms, as part of wider good governance agendas. Economic crisis in
the late 1990s fuelled challenges to Indonesia's hyper-centralised
authoritarian regime and helped to unlock strong demands for
democratisation and decentralisation as well as anti-corruption ini-
tiatives. Furthermore, following global tendencies towards a neo-lib-
eral, Post-Washington Consensus paradigm of governance reforms
(see Carroll & Jarvis, 2015a), these institutional reforms invited more
involvement of non-state actors in policy reform and policy-making
processes.
Not only did this environment mitigate against strong resistance
to transparency norms, it also created opportunities for strong collab-
orative work between state actors and civil society organisations. Civil
society organisations emerged as leading pro-democracy actors in
Indonesia in the late 1990s, gaining significant legitimacy as reform
actors that could support the development of democracy and the pro-
motion of good governance in Indonesia's emerging democracy (see
Budiman & Törnquist, 2001; Mietzner, 2012). The dominance of an
international agenda of global-development-cum-good-governance
gave primacy to discourses of “social capital,” “partnership” and “pub-
lic participation” as core elements of the global development agenda.
This positioned civil society organisations as key agents of governance
reform, mobilisation of public participation and implementation of
development programs (Carroll & Jarvis, 2015b, p. 292). In this con-
text, vibrant civil society organisations mushroomed (Suharko, 2011,
p. 463), building on established cross-organisational networks, and
expanding such networks globally through new links with interna-
tional NGOs and donors (Savirani, 2015; Subono, Priyono, &
Samadhi, 2007). In short, the increasing number of global and domes-
tic civil society networks, and their capacity to influence public dis-
course across a range of issues, gave Indonesian CSOs increased
credibility and leverage in public affairs, particularly in the spheres of
policy advocacy and global norm promotion, positioning these civil
society networks as credible insider proponents of global norms pro-
moting strengthened 'good governance' in the public sphere (see
Hanif, 2013, p. 137).
Transparency norms were institutionalised in various ways by
the national government, as part of these broader reform agendas.
The Indonesian government sought to display its serious commit-
ment to promoting transparency by introducing the Law
No.14/2008 on Openness of Public Information, which allowed citi-
zens to access all public documents and required all public institu-
tions (including publicly funded organisations at all tiers of
government) to publish such information. Indonesia's national gov-
ernment further embraced the promotion of transparency by partici-
pating as one of eight founding governments in the OGP in 2011. As
one of the most resource-rich countries in Southeast Asia, the Indo-
nesian government also opted to join the Extractive Industries
Transparency Initiative (EITI) Global network. After a long process
lasting for several years,9 EITI International recognised Indonesia as
a full member in October 2014, making Indonesia the second coun-
try to achieve EITI compliance in Southeast Asia, after the Demo-
cratic Republic of Timor Leste. Civil society coalitions promoting the
global transparency agenda were extensively involved in supporting
the Indonesian Government's efforts to complete the requisite
stages, procedures and mechanisms for EITI candidacy and compli-
ance (Hidayat, 2013; Soerjoatmodjo et al., 2014, p. 16).
4.2 | The rise of populist politics in post-
authoritarian Indonesia
While a more democratic Indonesia brought important opportunities
for localisation of transparency norms at the national level, such
changes occurred in parallel with a shift towards significant decentrali-
sation of a range of governance processes, including key elements of
extractive industry governance. These concurrent processes of
democratisation and decentralisation were also associated with the
emergence of a distinctive style of populist politics. A range of studies
have highlighted the rise of populism in post-authoritarian Indonesia,
both in the national political arena (Aspinall, 2015; Hadiz &
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Robison, 2017; Mietzner, 2015), and at the sub-national level
(Hamid, 2014; Mas'udi & Kurniawan, 2017; Pratikno & Lay, 2013).
The emergence of a distinctive style of populist politics in Indone-
sia responded in part to demands for more people-oriented political
leaders, amidst a new democratic politics in the country. Introduction
in 2005 of direct elections for the gubernur (head of the provincial
government) and bupati/walikota (head of the district/municipality)
intensified pressures for local rulers to respond to citizen' demands in
order to sustain their political support and legitimacy (Sulistiyanto &
Erb, 2009). Pressure for reform also came from a range of interna-
tional organisations, donors and development agencies that promoted
decentralisation and “good governance” reform agendas in Indonesia
(Hanif & Pratikno, 2012, pp. 193–195). Amidst such political transfor-
mations, local oligarchic power-holders struggled to retain their privi-
leges by transforming and reorganising their power into new
democratic political vehicles (see Hadiz, 2010), giving rise to a political
environment in which corporatist structures of elite power persisted,
alongside populist strategies of political legitimation.
The political style of populist political leaders that emerged in Indo-
nesia during this post-authoritarian era resonated closely with accounts
of a populist political style developed in wider scholarship on populism.
First, theorists of populism have emphasised the tendency of populist
political leaders to try and differentiate themselves from an elite estab-
lishment, invoking “othering” frames that highlight “the people versus
corrupt elites” or “them versus us” (Moffitt, 2017, p. 43). In the Indone-
sian context, the emergence of a new populist breed of politicians was
fostered by rising concern about large-scale and pervasive public cor-
ruption, as populist politicians sought to inspire new hope and promises
for systemic reforms to fight corruption.10 Theorists of populism have
further viewed a populist political style as involving an emphasis on cri-
sis, breakdown, and threat, and associated efforts to tap into citizens'
hopes regarding the resolution of such problems as a basis for building
political support (Moffitt, 2017, p. 45; Moffitt & Tormey, 2013, p. 391;
Wolff & Zimmermann, 2016, p. 21). Likewise, the variety of populism
that emerged in Indonesia framed itself as placing people at the centre,
while challenging an elite establishment that was deemed to be a
source of corruption, dysfunctionality and crisis (see Moffitt, 2017). A
populist political style has been further described by Moffitt (2017) as
entailing “bad manners,” a term that refers to leaders' efforts to directly
address “the people” while bypassing the established system
(Moffitt, 2017, p. 44; Moffitt & Tormey, 2013, p. 392). Resonating with
this characterisation, Mas'udi et al. (2018, p. 2) have highlighted the
tendency of populist leaders in Indonesia to pursue a political communi-
cation style based on “direct and unmediated relations” with the public
(see also Pratikno & Lay, 2013).
4.3 | Norm localisation in Bojonegoro: Explaining
uneven institutionalisation of global transparency
norms
The emergence and intensification of this distinctive populist mode of
local politics within Indonesia's post-authoritarian political
environment played an important role in shaping and constraining
norm localisation dynamics in our sub-national case of Bojonegoro.
The central sub-national decision-maker controlling the diffusion of
transparency norms in Bojonegoro has been the Regent Head or
bupati – the key political leader at the Regency level. The bupati is
therefore the principal norm-taker in Bojonegoro on which the below
analysis focuses.
As part of broader campaigns to promote transparency norms
within Indonesia, national Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), working
together with CSOs at the sub-national level, promoted a range of
efforts to institutionalise transparency in Bojonegoro. For example,
meetings and focus group discussions were organised to facilitate for-
mulation of local regulations regarding transparency of oil production.
Such initiatives built on broader efforts by the local government in
Bojonegoro to strengthen local resource governance – efforts that
had been ongoing since the local government started to exploit signifi-
cant oil reserves in Blok Cepu in 2005. In 2008, the newly elected
bupati of Bojonegoro, Suyoto, negotiated and signed a memorandum
of understanding with the central CSO coalition involved in promoting
transparency norms, in which the local government committed to
work on developing a range of extractive sector governance reforms
oriented towards adoption of transparency norms (Prijosusilo, 2012).
A major transparency initiative was developed over the subse-
quent 4 years, eventually giving rise in 2012 to a significant new dis-
trict government regulation on oil and gas industry transparency. In
2012 the district government of Bojonegoro released the Peraturan
Daerah (local regulation) No. 6/2012 on Transparency of Revenue,
Environment, and Corporate Social Responsibility of Oil and Gas
Exploitation. This primarily regulates four fundamental elements,
namely (a) local revenue from oil and gas exploitation, (b) information
concerning the socio-environmental impacts and risks of oil and gas
exploitation, (c) corporate social and environmental responsibilities
and (d) the establishment of a transparency team. This local regulation
encouraged comprehensive access to information related to the oil
and gas extractive industry, such as information regarding a profit-
sharing fund, taxation, Participating Interests (PI),11 environmental
management standards, emergency standards, and companies' Corpo-
rate Social Responsibility practices, including the percentage and
amount of their CSR budgets.12
Such policies have represented significant shifts towards
institutionalisation of global norms promoting extractive industry
transparency. In promoting these varied transparency initiatives, the
bupati built on important areas of resonance between global transpar-
ency norms and local norms associated with Indonesia's post-
authoritarian environment. Nonetheless, as we will see below, norm
institutionalisation has remained circumscribed in significant ways. In
particular, the processes through which these norms have been
implemented have themselves failed to incorporate the kinds of com-
mitments to norms of transparency, accountability and civil society
participation that would be consistent with constructivist accounts of
norm socialisation. Instead, patterns of norm institutionalisation
tended to align with the contexts in which the norms were able to be
used instrumentally by the bupati to support his own political
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interests, through drawing on transparency norms to bolster a range
of populist legitimation strategies. Thus, while normative and cogni-
tive congruence between global and local norms helped to facilitate
the overall salience of the transparency agenda within Indonesia, the
uneven patterns of norm localisation observed in this case cannot be
explained by variations in such patterns of convergence; rather, such
variation closely tracks the political interests of local populist political
leaders.
4.4 | Instrumentalizing global transparency norms
to support the political interests of local populist
leaders
Consistent with the prevailing populist style of local politics, the
bupati in Bojonegoro was often able to harness global transparency
norms as part of a broader repertoire of populist legitimation strate-
gies – emphasising his own differentiation from a “corrupt” elite
establishment, highlighting external crises and threats as a basis for
building political support, and building legitimacy for his political
agenda through pursuing “direct and unmediated relations” with the
public (Mas'udi et al., 2018, p. 2). As we see below, each of these
strategies enabled the bupati to align promotion of the global trans-
parency agenda with his own political interests.
4.4.1 | Framing transparency norms as part of
populist anti-corruption discourses
First, during his campaign to become the bupati, Suyoto, placed sig-
nificant emphasis on exposure of the failures of the previous bupati
– positioning himself in opposition to past practices of political cor-
ruption. Having secured a narrow and contentious electoral win in
Bojonegoro, without support from a substantial majority of
voters,13 Suyoto then found himself under pressure to show that
he could deliver more meaningful policies than simply exposing the
failures of the previous bupati – making public claims that he would
“fulfil my debt to the people in accordance with my promise during
the campaign.”14 Suyoto also needed to secure more support from
grassroots groups, since he represented a modernist Islamic party
(Partai Amanat Nasional-PAN), despite the majority of people in
Bojonegoro being traditional Moslems. By embracing the global
transparency agenda, Suyoto hoped not only to gain more support
from civil society organisations, but also wider political support
from grassroots groups and swing voters (Abdullah, 2014, p. 56). In
this sense, adoption of transparency in Bojonegoro rested impor-
tantly on the norm's potential to serve as a political “vehicle” for
Suyoto, as a local leader who had not yet secured sufficient popular
support (cf. Acharya, 2004, p. 248). This strategy proved effective,
with Suyoto being successfully re-elected for a second term in
2013, gaining 44.4% of the total vote, and winning 22 out of
27 sub-districts in Bojonegoro.
4.4.2 | Framing transparency norms as a response
to external threats or crises
Second, embracing transparency norms enabled Suyoto to reassure
the national government that the local government's resource extrac-
tion agenda would not create risks of social conflict, which in turn
could disturb the oil and gas production chain irreversibly. In numer-
ous public meetings, Suyoto presented such policies and initiatives as
means of guarding against risks or negative impacts of extraction that
could trigger political instability and threaten his political support.15
Such claims were also mobilised in support of his efforts to present
the extraction policies as means of supporting his electoral promises
to develop Bojonegoro to a level that would enable it to overtake the
more prosperous neighbouring Lamongan district (Abdullah, 2014,
p. 53). In these ways, Suyoto not only emphasised his promise to
overcome the problem of corrupt government, but also underlined
repeatedly the potential of transparency and open government to
counter risks of the resource curse, and associated forms of social
conflict, breakdown and crisis. Suyoto thus drew on well-established
populist repertoires of political action as a response to citizens' aspira-
tions for a new mode of politics to replace previous patterns of cor-
ruption (Moffitt, 2017, p. 45; Moffitt & Tormey, 2013, p. 391;
Wolff & Zimmermann, 2016, p. 21).
Supported by international and national CSO networks, local
norm-takers – including both the bupati and local CSOs – tried to
increase awareness amongst the public and the bupati's counter-
parts in local parliament regarding the importance of adopting
transparency initiatives as means of preventing the so-called oil
curse. To this end, local norm-takers identified and rehearsed cer-
tain key terms repeatedly, reinterpreting their meaning via links to
established contextual discourses or agendas, and then dramatising
the framing in order to gain broader public attention and under-
standing (cf. Acharya, 2011, p. 13; Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998,
p. 897). The supporting coalition of CSOs framed the risk of a
potential local resource curse in public deliberations, for instance,
using phrases such as “escaping the resource curse” and
“preventing the resource curse” in public campaigns, discussions
and many public meetings in Bojonegoro.16
Furthermore, Suyoto attempted to convince other local actors
that transparency offered a compelling panacea for a range of prob-
lems experienced by resource-rich regions in Indonesia. Suyoto often
stated in various public meetings that without transparency, resource
extraction was likely to generate social conflict and instability at the
grassroots level.17 He pointed to previous experiences of Indonesian
resource-rich regions, highlighting the Janus-faced nature of extrac-
tive industries. On the one hand, extractive activities potentially con-
tribute to local economic development, yet on the other hand, local
people frequently experience significant social and environmental bur-
dens, such as the loss of their primary income or other source of liveli-
hood due to land acquisition for oil and gas projects. In an interview
with an OGP official, he made a statement that mirrored a sentiment
repeated in many other public meetings18:
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Now we are getting a lot of oil and gas revenue … and
with that comes high expectations. … We need public
trust, and we need to explain what will happen, how
much revenue we will receive, and where is the money
going, and what for? This should be transparent …
Communication is the key. Trust is key. We don't want
to lose the public's trust. […] Trust comes from open-
ness and transparency. We must be transparent with
using our resources, with our budget; we must be open
about our problems and our capacity […]
By emphasising the resource curse as a threat to society and
offering his transparency agenda as a potential means of preventing
future crises, Suyoto was thus able to use the global transparency
agenda as a means of strengthening his own populist support base.
4.4.3 | Framing transparency norms as supportive
of direct political communication with “the people”
Third, Suyoto drew on global transparency norms in support of popu-
list legitimation strategies involving direct forms of political communi-
cation with the public. Two days after he was first appointed as
bupati, Suyoto introduced a direct weekly dialogue between local gov-
ernment officials and citizens from 1 p.m. to 3 p.m., scheduled to
occur each week after the Muslim Friday congregational prayer –
building on established practices whereby mosque members com-
monly engage in informal dialogue after the prayer. Suyoto claimed
that this Friday dialogue aimed to increase public trust in government,
channel public participation and create a space for public learning
(Musthofa, 2016, p. 8). Suyoto sought to expand the public audience
for these events by using both a local government-owned radio sta-
tion (Malowopati FM) and a private radio station (Madani FM) to
broadcast the weekly event live, and document a recorded version of
the ensuing public dialogue.19 By attaching his own public dialogues
onto these established dialogue practices, Suyoto sought to raise the
visibility of his government's transparency agenda, while representing
this as part of a broader commitment to communicate directly with
the public, in turn supporting his populist legitimation strategy. Such
strategies were further supported by communication initiatives such
as the establishment of a 24-hours a day direct SMS line to enable cit-
izens to communicate directly with the bupati.
Such strategies built in important ways on the domestic salience
of global transparency norms – enabling Suyoto to connect the global
norms with established discourses regarding avoidance of corruption
and the oil curse as a means of building popular political support at
the local level. Such congruence between global transparency norms
and local concerns about corruption and broader social and environ-
mental risks associated with the extractive sector supported norm
localisation processes by enabling Suyoto to align promotion of global
transparency norms with his own material political interests.
However, in evaluating the explanatory power of socialisation
versus interest-based accounts of the enabling conditions for norm
localisation, it is also crucial to consider examples in which the adop-
tion of transparency norms conflicted with elite local interests. As we
see in the following section, processes of normative congruence-
building proved to have weak causal effects on facilitating norm
localisation when they came into tension with countervailing political
interests of local elites.
4.4.4 | Tensions between transparency norms and
the political interests of local elites
Such threats to elite interests were particularly pronounced insofar as
the global transparency agenda's emphasis on the role of transparency
in strengthening broader processes of public accountability and civil
society participation threatened to weaken the bupati's personal con-
trol over natural resource governance processes. Two examples illus-
trate the ways in which such interests in retaining centralised and
personalised policy control undermined the extent to which transpar-
ency norms were institutionalised, in spite of persistent rhetorical
commitment to the agenda.
First, Suyoto regularly used local executive orders (Peraturan
Bupati) as means of implementing transparency norms, instead of
working through local regulations (Peraturan Daerah) that would
require agreement from the local parliament. For instance, as part of a
sub-national action plan for the OGP, Suyoto released the Peraturan
Bupati No.33/2016 on open procurement, which aimed to develop a
guide for enhancing transparent and accountable procurement pro-
cesses in local government. This implementation strategy was clearly
inconsistent with a broader normative commitment to transparency
and accountability, yet served his individual political interests by
enabling him to avoid public criticism and protracted negotiations in
the parliament regarding sensitive aspects of the transparency agenda.
A similar propensity to side-step transparency norms that conflicted
with his political interests was reflected in Suyoto's approach to con-
stituting a multi-stakeholder steering committee, which the OGP
requires as a means of facilitating transparency and participation of
representatives from local government, CSOs activists, private sector
and academia. As reported by the OGP's Independent Reporting
Mechanism (IRM), this committee incorporated limited participation
from CSOs, academics, or local parliament members, weakening the
transparency and accountability of local governance processes
(Novenanto, 2017).
Second, significant limits to the adoption of global transparency
norms were evident in relation to processes surrounding implementa-
tion of the local regulation on Transparency of Revenue, Environment,
and Corporate Social Responsibility of Oil and Gas Exploitation, dis-
cussed above. In this case, methods of implementation further rev-
ealed a lack of commitment to principles of public transparency and
accountability that would enable non-state actors, particularly civil
society organisations, to exercise influence over policy-making (see
Aaronson, 2011, pp. 53–54). A formal commitment to principles of
civil society participation – as mandated by local regulation
No. 6/2012 – was implemented via a specific initiative in which the
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local government established a multi-stakeholder transparency forum
in Bojonegoro. This multi-stakeholder forum was to operate within
the context of a range of other formal participation mechanisms that
were widely introduced in post-authoritarian Indonesia, such as the
government's Development Planning Deliberative Forum
(Musyawarah Perencanaan Pembangunan-MUSRENBANG), which
was initiated through Law No.25/2004 on the National Development
Planning System. Not only did such formal procedures reflect the
demands of global transparency norms, they also resonated strongly
with deeply entrenched local participatory practices, based around a
kind of local deliberative forum called musyawarah, which is utilised in
many areas of daily social life in Indonesia.
In practice, however, Suyoto's individual political interests in
maintaining control over implementation processes led him to delay
and dilute the practical implementation of such transparency norms.
The initiative to establish a new multi-stakeholder transparency forum
in Bojonegoro was delayed considerably20 and civil society participa-
tion in the planned multi-stakeholder forum was constrained in signifi-
cant ways. The transparency forum remained dominated by
bureaucratic officials, while the local government only selected two
local CSOs – the Bojonegoro Institute (BI) and the Institute of Devel-
opment for Society – together with six community leaders to join the
multi-stakeholder forum.21 Moreover, one of the two local CSOs that
were involved in the transparency forum had a very close interaction
with Bupati, while the other stated that they had never been invited
officially to participate in the meetings.22 In short, the transparency
forum remained dominated by bureaucratic officials under the control
of the Bupati, while facilitating little meaningful access to local CSOs
and Community Based Organisations. Furthermore, some members of
the local parliament questioned the transparency forum's role in moni-
toring extraction activities or enhancing the availability of information
regarding issues such as the collection and processing of oil (oil
lifting).23 In this sense, the multi-stakeholder forum can be more accu-
rately characterised as an elite-focused corporatist policy process
reflecting the persistence of long-established practices of state-corpo-
ratism, rather than as a bottom-up participatory mechanism operating
in accordance with global transparency norms.23
Despite broad congruence between global transparency norms
and prevailing ideas and identities within Indonesia's post-
authoritarian setting, norm localisation thus remained circumscribed
to the extent that these norms came into conflict with the political
interests of local elites – limiting the institutionalisation of more par-
ticipatory dimensions of the transparency agenda that threatened to
challenge local elite interests.
5 | DISCUSSION
As the article's analysis of empirical results has demonstrated, norm
localisation processes in this case were contingent on several inter-
acting processes. First, at a macro-level, there had been a major
domestic political change from an authoritarian to a democratic
regime, which served as a structural catalyst to create demand for
new norms. Transparency norms proved congruent in many ways with
the needs of the community in the post-authoritarian regime, which
craved access to information and opportunities to improve their
welfare.
Second, key local norm-takers, particularly the bupati, actively
harnessed global norms to support local political agendas. Transpar-
ency was successfully presented as an opportunity to minimise the
economic, social and political problems that might result from the
exploitation of oil and gas activities, while capturing the economic and
developmental benefits. Such congruence aided the localisation of
global transparency norms by creating ongoing incentives for the
bupati to support global transparency norms, enabling him to mobilise
global transparency norms as symbolic resources to help enhance his
own legitimacy. This enabled the norm to be institutionalised in
important ways without significant disruptions to the established sub-
national normative and political order, in which the bupati occupied a
central role. Local norm-takers thus helped to facilitate norm
localisation to the extent that there was strong alignment with
established local interests and beliefs.
Nonetheless, pressures for norm localisation processes to accom-
modate the local political context also placed certain constraints on
the ways in which the transparency norm was institutionalised. Efforts
to institutionalise transparency remained focused on relatively super-
ficial displays of direct communication and legal instalment, without
development of more extensive forms of civil society participation or
legal enforcement. Processes of policy reform continued to be domi-
nated by elite politicians, reflecting an individualistic and corporatist
style of local politics, while the role of the most affected communities
in these norm localisation processes remained limited. In this sense,
transparency norms were localised, but in ways that strengthened
populist, figure-based local politics rather than institutionalising a
more expansive interpretation of transparency norms – linked to more
participatory traditions of democratic “good governance.”
Bojonegoro's experience thus demonstrates how local elites can use
the transmission and adaptation of global governance norms as an
opportunity to strengthen their already privileged position in local
politics.
In short, varied patterns of acceptance and localisation of the
global transparency norm in Bojonegoro primarily tracked the degree
to which global transparency agendas were aligned or compatible with
the material political interests of local political norm-takers (Cortell &
Davis, 2000, p. 77). Significant forms of congruence were present
between global and local norms, but where these norms came into
conflict with the interests of local political leaders in sustaining local
political control, such normative congruence provided an insufficient
basis to motivate consistent patterns of norm adoption.
This analysis has built on existing theories of norm localisation
insofar as it has shown how norm localisation occurs through complex
interactions between global norms and established local practices and
beliefs. However, the article has also presented some important
extensions to the largely constructivist view of the norm localisation
process that has dominated previous scholarship. While such previous
work has focused primarily on processes of ideational and identity
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formation as a basis for building congruence between global norms
and established local cognitive and normative frameworks, this article
has illustrated that norm localisation processes within the populist
political environment in Bojonegoro also depended importantly on
more instrumental, strategic responses from local norm-takers. Such
responses were driven not simply by a search for normative or cogni-
tive congruence, but also by a strategic desire on the part of populist
local leaders to consolidate and strengthen their own local
power base.
By highlighting these dynamics in the context of this case, the
article has underlined the broader theoretical importance of detailed
attention to the instrumental motivations and strategic responses of
local leaders, particularly within a populist political context. As the
article has demonstrated, the propensity of populist local political eli-
tes to embrace external norms can be driven importantly by their own
interests in gaining political authority and legitimacy, and not neces-
sarily by a deeper search for normative or cognitive congruence. This
reflects the strong performative and rhetorical features of a populist
political style, together with the importance of symbolic resources in
underpinning the power of individualistic, figure-based populist
leaders.
6 | CONCLUSION
This article has contributed to debates about norm localisation pro-
cesses in the governance of natural resource sectors through an
investigation of how the global norm of transparency has been pro-
moted and institutionalised within sub-national processes of extrac-
tive industry governance in Indonesia. The preceding sections showed
that norm localisation relied crucially on local political leaders' ability
to use global governance norms as a basis for consolidating and
expanding their own local power base. Although this analysis has been
largely explorative in character, these findings provide the basis for
development of some preliminary hypotheses of potential relevance
to other local contexts in which a democratic populist style of politics
is influential. In such contexts, this article's analysis suggests that reso-
nance of a given global norm with local norms, discourses and para-
digms continues to be an important determinant of the prospects for
norm localisation within such contexts, since populist political leaders
rely on a broad base of popular support in order to sustain political
power. However, the motivations and strategies of local norm-takers
take on distinctive characteristics within populist political settings,
reflecting the distinctively strategic or instrumental motivations of
populist political leaders, and their reliance on rhetorical and perfor-
mative strategies. Such dynamics of norm localisation are hypo-
thesised to be important in other broadly democratic populist political
contexts, characterised by similar strategies for building public support
and legitimacy – whether at national or sub-national scales.
Not only does this analysis offer lessons of direct significance for
other populist political contexts in which global norms are being pro-
moted, it also highlights the potential value of more systematic work
aiming to adapt theories of norm localisation to varied domestic
political contexts. Such work would not only offer new theoretical
insights into causal mechanisms and enabling conditions associated
with processes of norm localisation, but also have significant practical
implications for ongoing efforts to promote the uptake and implemen-
tation of global governance norms seeking to strengthen extractive
sector governance across varied and often challenging political con-
texts around the world.
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ENDNOTES
1 EITI is an international initiative to mitigate the resource curse in
resource-rich countries (Kasekende, Abuka, & Sarr, 2016) that aims
primarily to reduce corruption in extractive industry through the
improvement of transparency, the EITI is designed as a voluntary
scrutiny mechanism (Klein, 2017). For further information on the EITI
scheme, see https://resourcegovernance.org/analysis-tools/publica
tions/extractive-industries-transparency-initiative-eiti. Accessed 4th
May 2017.
2
“Populism” is a contentious political concept. Many existing studies of
populism have focused on analysing populist ideology, discourses and
political and organisational strategies. Such features have been shown to
vary widely, encompassing both left and right ideologies, and strategies
based on both loose networks and tight forms of party discipline
(Moffitt & Tormey, 2013, p. 381). Other scholars have focused on
behavioural aspects of performance or rhetoric, through reference to a
populist political style (cf. Bonikowski, 2016, p. 14; Moffitt, 2017, p. 46;
Moffitt & Tormey, 2013, p. 388). The latter is the primary focus of this
article's analysis.
3 While some studies have focused on exploring the varied effects of
localisation processes, ranging from straightforward adoption of global
norms to various forms of adaptation or appropriation (Eimer, Lütz, &
Schüren, 2016), this paper focuses on the broader concept of norm
institutionalisation – reflecting a range of possible effects that are con-
sistent with the values and purposes of the global norms.
4 A number of authors have analysed how Indonesia has emerged as a site
of competition among various contemporary populist political styles,
including secular nationalist populism versus Islamic-oriented populism
(see Hadiz & Robison, 2017; Mas'udi & Kurniawan, 2017; Pratikno &
Lay, 2013).
5 Decentralisation in Indonesia has led to local government receiving
increased authority to approve licences for mining, along with important
responsibilities for managing and allocating local revenue associated
with mining activity (see Devi & Prayogo, 2013).
10 WINANTI AND HANIF
6 RegINA, is the Asia-Pacific Knowledge Hub for Better Governance in
Extractive Industries, based in the Department of Politics and Government,
Universitas Gadjah Mada, Indonesia, supported by the Revenue Watch
Institute (RWI), which was merged with the Natural Resource Charter and
re-branded as the Natural Resource Governance Institute (NRGI) in 2014.
7 The NRGI served as the coordinating institution and hub to facilitate
norm diffusion not only in Indonesia, but also across the entire South-
east Asia region. PWYP-Indonesia also developed a resource governance
knowledge centre to facilitate the transmission of global norms and dis-
courses from PWYP-Global to members of PWYP-Indonesia and gov-
ernment (national and local government).
8 Based on authors' observation and discussion with activists of
Bojonegoro Institute, local CSO, at Yogyakarta and Bojonegoro (2015,
2019). Also based on authors' participatory observation when attending
a range of Indonesian CSO forums and workshops regarding revenue
management and decentralisation between 2013 and 2017. Both
authors also served as the project coordinators of the RegINA's annual
training that equips civil society organisations in the Asia-Pacific region
with knowledge of extractive industries. The curriculum of the training
also puts emphasis on transparency and decentralisation issues.
9 The adoption of the EITI at the national level was initiated by the vice
chairman of the Corruption Eradication Commission, Erry Riyana Har-
djapamekas. After a long process, the President of Indonesia finally
released the Peraturan Presiden (Presidential Decree) No. 26/2010 on
Transparency of National and Local Revenue of Extractive Industry
(Soerjoatmodjo et al., 2014, pp. 14–15).
10 https://www.transparency.org/news/pressrelease/corruption_
perceptions_index_2016_vicious_circle_of_corruption_and_inequali.
accessed sixth August 2019.
11 Participating interest (PI) here refers to a right of local government –
represented by a local government-owned enterprise – to participate in
oil and gas exploitation.
12 Peraturan Daerah is an additional legal base of transparency since the
central government has introduced the National Law No.14/2008. The
National Law obliges every single public institution in Indonesia, includ-
ing the district administration of Bojonegoro, to publish its public infor-
mation and documents such as local annual budget allocations
(Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Daerah).
13 https://news.detik.com/berita-jawa-timur/d-867709/kpu-mulai-
rekapitulasi-suara-cabup-santoso-puasa-bicara. Accessed on 18 May
2016. Based on the data from the local electoral commission in
Bojonegoro, the direct election in Bojonegoro in 2007 showed that
Suyoto only received 37.2% of the total vote, followed by his rival San-
toso (32%) and Thalhah (30.7%).
14 Suyoto statement in discussion with the participants of RegINA's
annual Asia-Pacific training in 2014.
15 Suyoto statement in discussion with the participants of RegINA's
annual Asia-Pacific training in 2014, 2015 and 2016 at Bojonegoro. He
also repeated such statements at Muhammadiyah International Forum,
Leeds University, UK, 2017.
16 Based on authors' observations and discussions with activists at the
Bojonegoro Institute, a local CSO, in both Yogyakarta and Bojonegoro
(2015, 2019). See also https://rrcindonesia.com/en/about-us/; https://
pwyp-indonesia.org/en/category/publications/; http://bi.or.id/;
https://www.article33.or.id/
17 Based on authors' observation when the authors attended Suyoto's
presentations and public meetings in Bojonegoro, Yogyakarta, Jakarta
and Bogor between 2014 and 2017.
18 https://www.opengovpartnership.org/stories/interview-with-the-
regent-of-bojonegoro-suyoto-ngartep-mustajab/. Accessed on 17th
July 2019.
19 https://jipp.jatimprov.go.id/?page=database_detail&id=43. Accessed
17th July 2019.
20 In 2015, The bupati released the Regent Decree No. 88/234/
KEP/412.11/2015 on the Establishment of the Transparency Team.
http://pwyp-indonesia.org/id/1333/fgd-perda-nomor-6-tahun-2012-
tentang-transparansi-migas-di-kabupaten-bojonegoro/. Accessed May
16, 2017.
21 The Transparency Team consists of 11 representatives of local govern-
ment units, one local state enterprise, two selected CSOs, one repre-
sentative of an oil trade union, one local entrepreneur, and six
community leaders from impacted villages nearby the oil wells.
22 Interview with local CSO activist, Bojonegoro, January 2019.
23 http://www.suarabanyuurip.com/kabar/baca/tim-transparansi-migas-
bojonegoro-mandul.Acessed 15 December 2017.
24 Discussion with some CSO activists and researchers from Bojonegoro,
Yogyakarta, April 2017.
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